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ASTRID is the Advanced Sodium Technological 
Reactor for Industrial Demonstration which is intended 
to prepare the Generation IV reactor, with improvements 
in safety and operability. 
In order to comply with the related specifications, 
the Astrid project integrates innovative options. 
In the earlier phase of ASTRID project, a specific safety 
approach was set and its main guidelines were agreed by 
the French Nuclear Safety Authority. This safety design 
guide is currently applied as reference for the choices 
of the design options.  
The paper presents:  
 - The main design provisions, to prevent any 
severe accident, as far as reasonably possible;  
 - The design approach, called “top-down” approach, 
relating to the radiological “confinement” safety 
function.  
 
As concerns prevention of severe accident, the design 
measures for “neutron reactivity mastery” are presented. 
These measures are based on efficient, reliable, 
redundant and diversified means for reactor shutdown. In 
addition, core features and inherent reactor behavior are 
enhanced and supported if needed by innovative devices.   
 
In the same frame of prevention of severe accident, loss 
of the “decay heat removal” safety function must be 
practically eliminated in order to prevent, with a 
very high level of confidence, a severe accident that 
could lead to a cliff edge effect. The method applied 
to reach this objective is described and the resulting 
architecture of decay heat removal is presented.  
 In the frame of ASTRID safety studies, analyses are 
devoted to well define:  
- A domain of accidental sequences with very low 
occurrence frequency for which severe accident can 
reasonably be prevented thanks to appropriate design 
provisions,  
- A few hypothetical situations, consequences of which 
could not reasonably be mastered, requiring robust 
safety demonstrations, in terms of prevention.  
  
As concerns the mitigation of potential radiological 
consequences, the paper presents the design provisions 
based on a “plant state” approach.  
The main objectives, as regards the radiological risk, are 
to postpone a hypothetical off-site release of radioactive 
material coming from core degradation and also to 
decrease its health and environmental possible 
consequences.  
Design provisions are taken, considering the different 
potential release ways inside the confinement.  
 
 As for the sodium risk, main objectives are to limit by 
design an overpressure of the containment.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
ASTRID reactor is a technological demonstrator 
designed by CEA and its industrial partners (Ref. 1). 
Innovative options have been integrated to contribute to 
the safety and improve efficiency, reliability and 
operability.  
Complying with WENRA (Western European Nuclear 
Regulators Association) recommendations, the 
conceptual design of ASTRID takes into account a severe 
accident involving whole core degradation. 
 
The safety design approach of ASTRID is based on 
the defence in depth principle. 
The implementation of a defence in depth includes an 
extension of the design basis domain whatever the low 
probability of the events sequences. The objective is to 
prevent further the occurrence of a severe accident 
(definition of a SP domain). Despite this extension, 
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mitigation provisions are integrated to cope with the 
consequences of a severe accident (SM domain).  
  
This SM domain is used to check that the core 
degradation is acceptable and that the mitigation devices 
are suitable in order to reduce the off-site consequences.  
 
As regards severe accident situations leading to 
unreasonably mitigable consequences (high energetic 
scenario), a robust demonstration of prevention is set for 
each “practical eliminated” situation. 
 
II. METHODOLOGY FOR SAFETY 
DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
II.A Method for severe accident prevention 
 
II.A.1. Line of defence method (LoD) 
 
The ASTRID project takes into account the severe 
accident in accordance with the fourth level of defence in 
depth and uses, at the stage of the design, LoD method to 
show that the prevention of the severe accident is 
sufficient.   
The LoD method which implements the first three levels 
of the principle of defence in depth, allows to check that 
any accidental evolution of the state of the plant, up to 
severe accident, is prevented by minimal set (in quantity 
and quality) of lines of defence. These LoD are 
conceived in order to minimize the risks of common 
mode failure and thus by ensuring a diversification, a 
functional and physical independence between them.    
 
      A line of defence is described as strong (or ‘a’) if it 
corresponds physically either to passive equipment (e.g. 
structure) carried out and exploited like a radiological 
barrier, or with a system of safety conceived in particular 
according to the single failure criterion and qualified by 
representative tests. The components of the LoD must be 
designed with adapted margins with respect to the 
stresses corresponding to the situations in which they 
have to achieve their functions (application of the codes 
and standards). The order of magnitude of the probability 
of failure of a strong line (‘a’), based on the experience 
feedback of systems respecting such requirements, is of 
10-3 to 10-4 per year or per demand.  
  
A line of defence is described as average (or ` b') when it 
corresponds to a system that isn’t the object of the 
highest design requirements. In particular, its design 
according to the single failure criterion is not necessary. 
An average line can also take the form of an operator 
action if is simple allowing to be done within a 
reasonable delay, if the situation is easy to identify, and if 
it is described in the operating procedures. The order of 
magnitude of the probability of failure of an average line 
(‘b’), starting from the experience feedback, is of 10-1 to 
10-2 per year or per demand.  
The favorable natural behavior of the core during the 
accident, supplemented if needed by dedicated provisions 
called “additional provisions of safety for the prevention” 
(DCS-P), constitute an average line of defence.  
The link between the LoD and the safety classification of 
the materials which constitute them is presented in 
section II.C.  
   
II.A.2. Implementation of an extended prevention domain 
(SP)  
  
In the safety approach of ASTRID, the definition of the 
domain of the prevention situations (SP) fits first of all in 
the application of the principle of defence in depth, it 
corresponds for example to the under-level “3.b” of 
defence in depth as prescribed by WENRA.  
Moreover, the ASTRID Project has fixed, as design 
objective (within the limits of reasonably achievable), to 
prevent the severe accident including accidental 
sequences (or multiple failures) of extremely low 
occurrence frequency. Indeed, even if the estimated 
frequency of the sequence is very low, in particular the 
sequences with failure of the reactor shutdown, the 
prevention of the severe accident is required. The goal is 
to push back as much as reasonably achievable the limits 
of prevention of the severe accident. The analysis of the 
consequences allows in particular to seek at the stage of 
the design the improvement of the natural behavior of the 
core and if needed to define additional devices of 
prevention (DCS-P).   
 
II.A.3. Practically Eliminated Situations (SPE)  
 
They are situations whose radiological consequences 
can’t be reasonably controlled. They must be the object 
on a case-by-case basis robust demonstration of safety as 
regards the prevention. For a family or a kind of 
situations, only the extreme cases the consequences of 
which would not be controllable have to be practically 
eliminated. The less severe events of the family are taken 
into account in the preceding domains (Operating 
Conditions, SP, SM).  
   
The practically eliminated situations are not subject of a 
safety analysis to the usual direction; the safety analysis 
relates on the accidental sequences involving the risk to 
lead to such an eliminated situation and not to the 
consequences of the situation itself. The robust 
demonstration of a satisfactory prevention of SPE, 
require implementation of concrete provisions of 
prevention. The rules of analysis (e.g. mode of taking 
into account of uncertainties) correspond to those used 
for the treatment of the initiating accidental sequences.  
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The deterministic demonstration is supplemented, when 
if it is relevant, by a probabilistic study (e.g. for loss of 
the DHR function).  
  
II.B Method for severe accident mitigation  
 
   The phenomena concerned in the scenarios of severe 
accident being radically different from those intervening 
in the domain of prevention, the need to define an 
approach dedicated to the severe accidents is essential.  
On previous SFR, the approach was focused on the 
analysis of a single initiating transient (unprotected 
primary pumps trip) arbitrarily penalized to cause sodium 
boiling. The primary phase of the accident was studied 
thoroughly, in particular with the important experimental 
programs carried out in the CABRI facility.    
  
On the ASTRID project, although a new R & D program 
and more powerful computational tools come to improve 
knowledge and to reduce uncertainties, the orientations of 
safety aim at attenuating the influence of uncertainties 
through the definition of a new approach of the studies, in 
particular:  
- the list of the studied initiating events is representative 
of the families of sequences which can be at the origin 
of a severe accident;   
- the analysis is done with the “best estimate” approach 
which could be supplemented by the identification of 
the parameters having a significant influence on the 
results, and the analysis of their associated 
uncertainties;  
- with respect to the development of the severe accident, 
the usual mechanistic approach describing a core 
degradation is preserved and a second approach is 
applied in parallel. This one consists in uncoupling the 
description of the successive phases of the severe 
accident, in order to identify the parameters having a 
significant influence on each phase and to perform 
sensitivity studies (physico-statistics approach).   
   
The studies of severe accident will thus provide more 
complete and detailed results compared to “best estimate 
single mechanistic calculation.  
   
II.B.1. “Top-Down” approach and “Lines of 
mitigation” method (LoM) 
 
  In the event of severe accident, the general safety 
objective being to minimize the radiological 
consequences, the mitigation provisions based on the 
implementation of barriers beyond the first barrier.  
The LoM method defined for ASTRID intended to 
identify the whole functions necessary to ensure the 
confinement of radiological products.   
This allows to structure the mitigation provisions 
contributing in fine radiological containment.    
   
The fourth level of defence in depth is treated while 
following a “Top-Down” approach which aims at 
uncoupling, as much as reasonably possible, the LoM 
design and the evaluation of the loadings to which they 
are subjected:   
- design mitigation provisions following a plant state 
approach, by aiming at the best effectiveness and by 
pushing back the limits of behavior as much as 
reasonably achievable, until reaching a homogeneous 
behavior of the LoM;   
- minimization by design of the consequences of the 
severe accident, considering the various families of 
initiating events.   
 
The plant state approach consists in postulating several 
states of core degradation, each state representing a 
certain level of degradation of the safety functions. These 
levels can be for example associated to the potential 
mechanical energy release. The safety functions defining 
these states are mainly: leak tightness of the primary 
circuit, structural integrity of the primary circuit, 
operability of the cooling systems, management of the 
sodium leaks, leak tightness of the confinement system.   
 
The “Top-Down” approach thus consists in controlling, 
by LoM design, as far as reasonable achievable the 
degraded states. The minimization by design of the 
severe accident consequences is not leading to a 
reduction of the required performances of the mitigation 
means.  
  
The functions associated to the main LoM are:   
- LoM-1: To identify and reinforce the weak points of the 
primary circuit in terms of containment and resistance 
to a hypothetical mechanical energy release. To set up 
provisions dedicated to management of the severe 
accident in the primary circuit, also called “additional 
provisions of safety for the mitigation” (DCS-M), in 
particular for the containment of whole the corium 
(option in vessel retention). To reinforce the weak 
points of the cooling circuits.  
- LoM-2: To limit a pressurization of the confinement 
system which would be due to a possible sodium fire; 
-  To prevent the contact of sodium and concrete. To 
delay the possible radioactive release, starting from the 
various possible ways of release (cover-gas circuit, roof 
leakages…), by implementing intermediate volumes 
inside the confinement system.  
- LoM-3: To implement a leak tight confinement system; 
to isolate ventilations in an optimal way with respect to 
the; to minimize the risks of by-pass of the confinement 
system.  
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Fig.1: Lines of defence and top-down approach 
   
II.C Safety classification of the equipment 
 
The safety classification of the equipment (SSC)   
is an important stage of the design process. 
Usually the classification of the SSC is based on the 
significance of the related safety functions. 
 
For ASTRID, the method used for classification is firstly 
based on the role of each SCC in the safety 
demonstration in particular in terms of LoD and LoM.  
 
The role of the SSC in the safety demonstrations is thus 
used as reference for classification as follows:   
- Importance of the SSC contribution to the 
demonstration  (e.g. effectiveness, reliability); 
- Importance of the impact in case of a SSC failure (e.g. 
level of consequences, prevention of SPE).  
  
For ASTRID, the main safety classes are defined as 
follows:  
- Safety classes of prevention:   
• CSP-1: SSC whose failure in the safety 
demonstration must be equivalent to the failure 
more than one strong LoD. 
• CSP-2: SSC involved in a strong LoD, including 
confinement barrier needed to meet the objectives 
of category 4. 
• CSP-3:   
o SSC whose failure impacts SSC classified in 
CSP-1 or CSP-2;   
o barrier devoted to meet the objectives of 
category 2;   
o SSC monitoring SSC classified in CSP-1 or 
CSP-2 in order to check the availability of 
these materials. 
- Safety class of severe accident mitigation:  
CSM:   SSC involved in a  LoM.   
        
III.PREVENTION OF SEVERE ACCIDENT 
  
III.A Reactivity control 
  
The prevention of the severe accident is ensured by:  
- Preventive measures of the initiating events likely to 
damage the core.  
- Control of the fundamental safety functions: 
• the reactivity control, 
• the decay heat removal. 
- The preventive measures necessary to justify “practical 
elimination” of particular severe accident situations 
whose radiological consequences cannot reasonably be 
limited.   
  
The reactivity control measures are first based on 
efficient, reliable, redundant and diversified systems for 
reactor shutdown. 
In addition, inherent core behavior is enhanced and 
supported if needed by innovative devices.  
These systems are deterministically designed with 
stringent criteria.  
 
An important need required for ASTRID core design 
is to insert sufficient negative reactivity in case of 
unprotected loss of cooling accident to avoid severe 
accident. The CFV core concept (Ref. 2) provides a large 
part of negative reactivity insertion thanks to its favorable 
natural behavior (neutron feedback). At this design stage, 
to ensure larger margins, the natural behavior of the core 
is completed by additional safety devices able to insert 
sufficient negative reactivity (DCS-P).  
 
III.A.1. Features of the main shutdown systems  
  
An innovative reactivity control (Ref. 3) which is 
studied in the frame of the ASTRID project is presented. 
All the rods participate to power management and 
shutdown. Comparatively to traditional systems, the 
gains of this architecture in terms of safety, in particular   
in case of control rods withdrawal, are noticeable and 
allow reducing the overall number of control rods. 
 
The reactivity control is pressed on a set of mobile 
neutron absorbents positioned in the core. The control 
rods are divided into two distinct and diversified families.  
Two redundant and diversified automatic shutdown 
systems are envisaged (each system includes a mix of the 
two families of rods). 
Both families of control rods, RBC and RBD, provide at 
the same time the functions of control (start up, 
adjustment of the neutronic power, compensation of the 
burn-up, neutronic flux adjustment) and the function of 
reactor shutdown. This kind of architecture, called RID 
(for “pilotage en RIDeau”), presents compared to a 
conventional system of SPX type, the following 
advantages:  
- the reactivity core potential at the beginning of cycle 
being only compensated by the insertion of the control 
rods in the core, so plus the number of inserted rods is 
important, less the abnormal control rod withdrawal 
(CRW) will be severe. With the same number of rods, 
the behavior in case of CRW is thus improved with 
architecture RID;  
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- the possibility to improve the distribution of both rod 
families (RBC and RBD). At this design stage (9 RBD 
+ 9 RBC) are implemented in ASTRID.   
 
The control rods are composed of absorbents in B4C 
enriched in 10B.   
 
RBC is a control rod element dedicated to reactor 
operation and shutdown. In case of gravity drop, the RBC 
rods drop with their driving line after decoupling the 
electromagnets located in gas, above the sodium level.  
 
RBD is a diversified control element used for reactor 
operation and shutdown too, contrarily to past where it 
was only dedicated to safety function. As a major design 
option, disconnection in case of shutdown between the 
RBD rod and its drive mechanism would occur via an 
electromagnet located in sodium. 
 
RBC and RBD are gathered in two independent groups 
connected to the shutdown systems. 
The safety analysis required the detection of each 
initiating event by two different parameters monitored by 
each shutdown system.  
 
III.A.2. Additional design provisions (DCS-P)  
 
 Within the framework of the development of 
additional Safety provisions aiming to severe accident  
Prevention (DCS-P), it is envisaged to supplement the 
natural behavior of the core in case of total failure of both 
shutdown systems by the passive intervention of two 
types of (DCS-P) initiated by a physical phenomenon:   
- one in case of loss of flow, noted (DCS-P) – H rod 
(Ref. 4); 
- the other, under development, in case of temperature 
increase (Curie point), noted (DCS-P) – T rod. 
 
The insertion of negative reactivity by one of these 
systems (DCS-P) allows to stop the chain reaction and to 
ensure a long term safe state, compatible with the 
behavior of the structures.  
 
(DCS-P)-H would constitute a provision independent of 
both shutdown systems. It has only a safety function.   
  
(DCS-P)-T is carried by one family of control rods. The 
(DCS-P)-T includes an electromagnet in sodium.  
 
III.B Decay heat removal safety systems 
 
After reactor shutdown, the core decay heat must be 
adequately removed in order to avoid large damage of 
core and primary circuit structures. This is achieved by 
maintaining a sufficient sodium level in the primary 
circuit and with capability to remove the decay heat by 
forced convection and by natural circulation if the normal 
electrical supply of the primary pumps fails as well as 
implementation of dedicated circuits. 
The main challenge concerning the decay heat removal 
function is to implement very reliable systems capable to 
maintain the reactor in safe conditions during long time, 
until the decay heat decreases sufficiently to allow the 
decay heat removal through natural thermal losses or by a 
diverse heat removal system.  
In case of severe accident, the long term management of 
molten fuel (corium) is mandatory. This leads to 
implement devices for both maintaining the corium in a 
sub-critical state, and removing its decay heat. The 
devices implemented for achieving these functions 
should not be unacceptably damaged by the accident. 
 
The architecture and the reliability of the systems 
involved in the decay heat removal have to allow the 
practical elimination of the complete loss of the DHR 
function. 
 
This objective is translated in particular by:  
- the search for one or several systems with important 
passive capacity and the less dependent possible to 
support systems,  
- a design allowing to facilitate reparability in case of 
failure. 
 
To obtain the practical elimination of the total loss of the 
function, the architecture is based on the implementation 
of three safety systems: 
- Two DHR systems insuring a direct cooling of the 
primary sodium, by heat exchangers in the vessel diving 
into the primary sodium (called RRA and RRB). Each 
system should implement multiple trains; 
- A system implemented outside of the safeity vessel. It is 
absorbing the heat emitted by radiation and convection 
from the vessels. This system introduces a level of 
additional diversification with regard to RRA and RRB. 
It presents in particular the advantage not to transit by the 
reactor roof and not to be submitted directly to the 
hypothetical mechanical energy release in case of severe 
accident.  
The RRA is an active system located in the cold plenum. 
The RRB is a passive system located in the hot plenum. 
 
IV. MITIGATION OF SEVERE ACCIDENT 
CONSEQUENCES 
 
IV.A Core concept and additional safety devices 
(DCS-M) 
 
The ASTRID core includes devices dedicated to the 
mitigation of the whole core accident. These devices 
must reduce the effects of a severe accident through the 
following actions:  
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- CFV core concept which allow to avoid large reactivity 
insertion during the primary phase of the accident 
(Sodium void effect); 
- Fuel and structural materials re-localization on the core 
catcher;  
- Limitation of radial corium propagation, in order to 
avoid the in-vessel fuel storage degradation. 
 
This additional mitigation device is characterized by 
transfer tubes (DCS-M-TT), in the core and within the 
first line of reflector sub-assemblies.    
 
IV.B Enhanced confinement provisions 
 
The function of containment is provided by the 
implementation of design provisions and measures to 
maintain the radiological substances in the plant in order 
to respect the associated safety objectives (environment 
and people protection)  
   
This section presents the design approach for the 
reactor confinement provisions related to severe accident.  
 
This hypothetical accident is retained according the 
fourth level of defence in depth. It corresponds to the 
most significantly severe conditions considered because 
of the importance of the radiological inventory released 
following the loss of the first barrier integrity. The 
provisions are also beneficial for events with lower 
radiological risk. 
  
The design approach consists to limit and delay the 
potential releases towards the environment by the 
implementation of adequate provisions in the objective to 
prevent and limit the measures protection of the 
populations. This objective includes measures of 
sheltering limited in space, absence of emergency 
evacuation beyond the immediate vicinity of the plant, 
absence of long-term restrictions of food consumption 
and absence of permanent rehousing.   
  
During such an accident, the fission products contained in 
fuel are released. A part is trapped in sodium, in 
particular a more or less large fraction of iodine and 
cesium which have strong chemical affinities with it. The 
remainder is found in gas (cover-gas volume).  
The transfer of the mobile radiological inventory in the 
plant and potentially towards the environment is 
consecutive:  
- to the pressurization of the cover-gas volume due to:  
• the release of fission gases and volatile isotopes 
not trapped by sodium;  
• heat produces by the fission products which are 
in the cover-gas volume;  
• dilation of sodium. 
- to the possible primary sodium circuit leaks in case of 
an hypothetical important mechanical energy release, in 
particular on the level of the main vessel and the roof. 
These sodium leaks can growth the pressure of the 
buildings where they take place, especially in case of 
sodium fire.  
 
The analysis which guides the choice of the confinement 
provisions is based on the identification of the release 
ways, by taking account of the risk of degradation of the 
requested barriers. It takes account of the risks of 
confinement by-pass. The experience feedback of the 
former reactors is also integrated into this analysis.  
                             
It is noted that, as the objective is to avoid by design high 
energetic accidents, the most realistic way of release is 
the cover-gas circuit, via its valves. Nevertheless, the 
other potential ways, resulting from the failure of 
barriers, are considered in accordance with the 
application of the “Top-Down” approach presented in 
section II. 
  
 IV.B.1. Safety provisions of each potential release way 
 
 IV.B.1. Argon circuit   
 
This argon circuit has in particular as function to limit 
the variations of cover-gas pressure under normal 
operations. It is thus a circuit made up of several volumes 
of great capacity and provided with safety valves.   
The confinement measures implemented on this circuit 
are the following ones: 
- to isolate the circuit at its ends in order to profit from its 
great volume which limits the pressure, dilutes 
contaminated gas, condenses the volatile ones and 
delay the transfers; 
- to recover in a retention room the contaminated gas 
possibly released by the safety valves;  
- to locate the whole circuit and the retention room inside 
the confinement system. 
 
This design of the cover-gas circuit allows the limitation 
of the circuit leaks, allows to enhance the delays and to 
contain the eventual leaks inside the confinement system 
without risk of by-pass.  
   
IV.B.1.2 Roof 
 
Under normal operation, the roof ensures the leak 
tightness of the cover-gas circuit in particular at the level 
of its penetrations which are provided with specific 
devices.  
The severe accident could lead to a mechanical energy 
release likely to damage the sealing of the roof.   
The design takes into account the possibility of a leak 
between the cover-gas volume and the above roof area. 
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This leak can lead to a release of gas towards the above 
roof area and to a primary sodium ejection which can 
burn in contact with air. 
The selected confinement provisions have two objectives:   
- to prevent that the pressure, increase due to the sodium 
fire does not damage the confinement system;   
- to create a zone confining the leakages through the 
roof.  
 
To this end, the above roof area is contained in a as low 
as possible small volume, distinct from the confinement 
system. 
This volume is voluntarily not perfectly sealed  in order 
to limit the possible duration of fire by air release out of 
the volume, and thus to limit the effects of fire (pressure, 
temperature) in the volume and the reactor building. 
Moreover, the design of the systems located in this zone 
and needed, in post-accidental situation, takes account of 
these effects. The risk of vapor production by heating of 
the concrete is also considered. 
 
The leak-tightness of this zone is defined in order that the 
loadings in terms of pressure and temperature of the 
confinement system are limited. This leak-tightness is in 
particular ensured by the above roof area ventilation 
isolation. 
 
 IV.B.1.3 Primary  Vessel  
  
The primary vessel contains a core catcher whose object 
is to avoid the damage of confinement system. 
 
Because of the possible mechanical energy release during 
the accident, the leakage of the main vessel could occur. 
Thereby, it is surrounded by a safety vessel which is 
conceived not to be damaged by the accident.  
 
In the vessels gap, the nitrogen circuit has in particular as 
a function to maintain the pressure between the primary 
vessel and the safety vessel in an acceptable value, in 
particular thanks to a safety valve connected to the cover-
gas circuit. The other safety valves are connected to the 
retention room.   
  
The main confinement measure is to isolate the nitrogen 
circuit to limit the contamination coming from the vessel 
or the cover-gas volume (gas or sodium leaks). 
As for the cover-gas circuit, the whole nitrogen circuit is 
located inside the confinement system what allows to 
contain the possible leaks without risk of confinement 
by-pass. 
 
IV.B.1.4 Circuits connected to the primary circuit  
 
The fluid circuits (except sodium circuit) connected to 
the primary circuit are isolated. It concerns in particular:   
- Gas circuits ensuring the leak tightness of the roof 
penetrations;   
- Roof cooling system.   
 
The secondary sodium circuits are designed to remain 
leak-tight in case of a hypothetical mechanical energy 
release.  
Nevertheless, leaks of the heat exchangers between 
primary sodium circuit and secondary sodium are 
considered because they are equipment impacted by the 
accident. In this case, the confinement is ensured by the 
part of the secondary circuit which is not affected.  
However, provisions to manage these possible leaks are 
under investigation (e.g. isolating valves). 
   
IV.B.2 Confinement system 
   
In order to avoid the risks of by-pass, the confinement 
system this includes the whole ways of releases up to the 
isolation devices, as well as the primary circuit. 
Concerning the sodium circuits (circuit of extraction of 
the normal power and of decay heat removal), the 
approach consists in being ensured by design which they 
are not damaged by the severe accident and to study 
provisions to manage the possible leaks through the most 
impacted zones.  
 
The containment system is carried by the reactor 
building. The risks of by-pass are limited by: 
- the isolation of  reactor building ventilation;  
- Implementations of leak tight devices at the singular 
points of the building in particular secondary sodium 
loop penetrations and openings. These singular points 
are located at lower part of the building, in front of 
adjacent buildings. 
 
The selected design provisions ensure that the severe 
accident does not lead to a significant pressure and 
temperature increase inside the building. This one is 
designed to resist to loadings more important than those 
induced by the severe accident (earthquake, aircraft 
crash…). 
The option of reactor building as a confinement system, 
including a large volume, allows the limitation of the 
pressure during the accident.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the earlier phase of ASTRID project, a specific 
safety approach was set and its main orientations 
were agreed by the French Nuclear Safety Authority. 
This safety design guideline is currently applied upon the 
new phase of basic design for the choices of the design 
options.  
 
Reactivity mastery function is warranted by two diverse 
shutdown systems with related design criteria giving 
sufficient safety margins for different plant states. 
Beyond the high reliability of these shutdown systems, 
inherent behavior of reactor is improved to cope with 
hypothetical transients without scram. This second 
approach by “event family” (ULOF, ULOHS…) is 
completed in parallel by a third “plant state” approach 
involving special devices acting in case of loss of flow or 
core heating whatever the initiating event of the accident. 
  
Decay heat removal function is assured by several 
systems with diversified hydraulic zone of 
implementation in order to deal each possible DHR fault 
situation. DHR means are composed by a system devoted 
to heat removal at normal shutdown states, two different 
safety systems connected to primary circuit, an ultimate 
system inside the reactor vault to manage hypothetical 
situations with degraded reactor, at long term. All these 
systems have a potential for repair at short time. 
  
Finally, the design of the ASTRID confinement 
provisions includes the set-up of a confinement system 
which contains all the release ways of radioactive 
materials and which recovers their possible leaks.  
 
A special attention is given to the singular points in order 
to avoid any risk of by-pass through the confinement 
system. 
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